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Introduction 
The participation of people of Chinese descent in Australian politics has emerged as a critical 
question in contemporary Australian democracy. Whether discussing the Chinese "push" that 
was key to unseating John Howard in Bennelong (Saville 2007), or the China connections that 
undid MPs Michael Johnson and Joel Fitzgibbon (Baker et al. 2010), or the Stern Hu case 
(Callick 2010), the debate about the Chinese (including the usefulness of that composite label for 
such a diverse set of social groups) calls for a new set of theoretical parameters to locate and 
analyse the Chinese presence. This paper proposes that the Chinese question in all its dimensions 
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generates the first case of a "post-multicultural" politics, one that can more usefully be framed 
through the use of the "empire" concept (Jakubowicz 2003).  
 
The land that came to be called Australia was seized by the British empire; the society 
established there transmuted over time into an ongoing Australian empire project. From the 
outset the modern Chinese imperial project, originally rather inchoate and demographic under 
the Qing rather than military or institutional (lacking those capacities), was constituted in 
Australian politics as the threatening "Other" in terms of race, sexuality, economy and 
religiosity. The Chinese were portrayed as dangerous on all fronts; this apprehension embedded 
them in the Australian political imaginary albeit in a negative form, despite their fast dwindling 
presence after Federation as a consequence of White Australia.  The past generation and a half 
have seen a reinvigoration of the presence of Chinese in Australia and as Australians, following 
the ending of White Australia. The new Chinese presence, this time supported by a rapidly re-
empowered Chinese imperial capacity borne by increasing political and economic resources, has 
clear economic impacts - but the political questions (both empirical and theoretical) are less 
obvious .  How has Australian politics been affected by these changes, and in what sense has the 
Chinese presence ensured an imperially-inflected globally-alerted national politics in Australia? 
 
The paper uses the term “empire” and its adjectival form “imperial” in a consciously provocative 
approach to the study of multicultural societies. “Multicultural” in its policy/analytical 
applications refers to national societies affected by global population flows, and the internal 
challenges generated by the rapid emergence of diasporic communities. Multicultural approaches 
analyse the national political, economic and cultural history of the society under review, and the 
anthropological and socio-cultural transformations wrought by upon it and the incoming peoples 
by their interaction. Explanation tends to be sought then in the specificity of the society, rather 
than viewing each society as framed by the modern world system of nation states.  
 
The concept of “empire project” moves us into a wider frame of reference, both geographically 
and historically, by suggesting that many modern states manifest some of the characteristics of 
empires (even if the word is an anathema to them). These include an expansionary view of 
political, economic or cultural boundaries, a transformational approach seeking to form a unitary 
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“people” addressed to the diversity of incoming populations within those boundaries, and a 
subordination of challenges to the hegemony of the economic and politico-cultural elites 
especially where these arise either from Indigenous populations that have been “conquered” or 
from incoming diasporas that owe allegiance elsewhere.  
 
“Australian empire project” provides a short-hand term that captures these multiple dynamics, 
proposing that these three crucial parameters of boundary expansion and protection, Indigenous 
subordination, and diversity transformation (or “normalisation” (Foucault1977), set up an 
energetic pyramid of forces that are integrally tied together. External and internal economic, 
environmental and political changes are both constrained by and place pressure on these 
parameters. For the first time in its modern history, Australia now has to engage on two fronts 
with another imperial project, that of China. On two of the key external parameters - boundaries 
and cultural normalisation - Australia and China are now more deeply engaged than Australia 
has been since Federation, when White Australia had the effect of forcing cultural 
disengagement (with a then far less politically and economically coherent and powerful China).  
  
Context  
Two weeks out from the August 2010 Federal election former Prime Minister and local member 
for Bennelong John Howard was seen on TV spruiking support from a Chinese audience for the 
Liberal Party in the adjacent seat of Bradfield.  Fifteen years ago it had been Howard’s equivocal 
position on the rise of Pauline Hanson and her racist speech, and his rumoured blocking of Hong 
Kong-born state politician Helen Sham-Ho’s bid for Liberal Senate pre-selection, that had 
triggered a mini-split in the NSW Liberal branch. One immediate outcome of that split was the 
creation of the Unity (團結 Tuan Jei) Party, which seemed to offer an opposite perspective to 
that of Hanson’s One Nation. Unity had an attraction for former key political players in the NSW 
Liberal Party, winning a state Legislative Council seat for its leader Dr Peter Wong.  
  
No other ethnic community was being accorded quite the same level of care and attention from 
the former Prime Minister, who had lost Bennelong in 2007 under an organising onslaught that 
had allied young activists from many different Asian communities with a broader progressive 
community coalition (Saville 2007).  During that election campaign, Saville reports that 
“Robert” ( a nom de guerre) offered the support of a group of Chinese senior figures to the ALP 
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candidate Maxine McKew, under the tag “MSG” (Maxine Support Group); when the vote is in 
and she has been victorious, he texts her: “The Emperor has lost his mandate from Heaven” 
(Saville 2007, pp. 45, 161).  By 2010, the new emperor (former PM Kevin Rudd) /empress (new 
PM Julia Gillard) would come perilously close to the same fate. 
  
Seven days out from the election and Kevin Rudd was in Bennelong, talking to children and their 
parents at the Feng Hua Mandarin Saturday morning school, held in the Eastwood Public School. 
He was trying to repair the damage done to his fervent supporter Maxine McKew among her 
Asian supporters by the bloody way he has been dispatched as Prime Minister, and their loss of 
confidence in the ALP’s commitment to issues of human rights and racial justice. Later Rudd 
shared Yum Cha at King’s Seafood restaurant, and was tearful as the Chinese kids moved from 
English to Mandarin for the last verse of “Edelweiss” from the “Sound of Music”, a film about 
children as refugees fleeing for their lives (Saville 2010; Marx 2010). 
  
The energy invested by former Prime Ministers in salvaging the damaged relations between their 
parties and the Chinese communities, suggests that the emergence of the Chinese in the political 
agenda of contemporary Australia reflects something more than a just one dimension of 
multiculturalism common to all immigrant communities - by pointing to political concentration, 
financial resources, and international linkages.   
 
With the concentration of Chinese Australian voters in particular usually middle-class and 
therefore swinging electorates and their presence there in large numbers (Coughlan 2008), they 
have the capacity in closely-fought elections to swing seats and change governments.  For this to 
occur en-masse, it requires some sort of trigger to vote according to an “ethnic” rather than 
economic or partisan sensibility (whatever “ethnic” may imply - depending on one’s perspective 
it may mean in relation to Australian Chinese a perception of trans-national economic self-
interest, a sense of Confucian value-based moral and efficacy assessment of the competing 
political parties, or a sensitivity to any taint of racism attached to candidates or policies).   
 
China-born Australians and their families are heavily concentrated in key occupations, including 
IT, medicine and commerce, as well as real estate and international trade (Coughlan 2008). They 
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are on average therefore quite well-off economically, and can direct their discretionary financial 
resources in support of their favoured political parties or candidates. Indeed the Unity Party’s 
Peter Wong had previously been a key fund-raiser for the NSW Division of the Liberal Party, 
and his resignation in the late 1990s had significant financial impact on the Division.  As is noted 
below, the involvement of the Chinese communities in political fund-raising had already had 
wider ramifications in the Australian political system. 
 
In relation to Chinese communities and relations, Australia now experiences two separate though 
interacting processes – one which relates to the internal problems of the Australian empire 
project, responding to the immigrant, racialised, ethno-national differentiation and class status of 
Chinese settlers; the other which is the consequence of the inter-imperial relations of Australia 
and China.  This paper aims to introduce the dynamics of each of these dimensions, point to 
zones where they overlap, and suggest the research implications of this descriptive analysis. 
  
Empire and social order 
Much of the debate about cultural diversity and political life in modern democracies has been 
examined through the lens of “multiculturalism”.  Modood for instance argues that “a sense of 
belonging to one’s country is necessary to make a success of a multicultural society” (Modood 
2007, p.150). It requires “a citizenship and the right to make a claim on the national identity in 
which negative difference is challenged and supplanted by positive difference” (Modood 2007, 
p.153). Here the focus is on “the nation” as a political form. Yet as Negri, Hardt and Zolo have 
argued, the (national) “people is not an immediate nor an eternal identity, but rather the result of 
a complex process, which is proper to a specific social formation and historical period” (Negri et 
al. 2008, p.82).  The key to the construction of the people is representation, both culturally and 
politically. 
  
In a period of globalization, which arguably has been the characteristic political geography of the 
modern epoch, nation states exist in relation only to each other, and many perform as though 
they were empires. Empires are essentially multicultural collectivities governed by a central 
force, with a hierarchical structure of cultural power, in which the organisation of diversity 
reflects the interests of the dominant political grouping.  The social technologies necessary to 
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turn the populations of their territories into a people, presents a central challenge for all empires.  
The Australian nation displays the three important imperial characteristics referred to above; 
namely a history of competition with other empires for control of territory (politically and/or 
economically), the unresolved challenge in relation to the place of the Indigenous inhabitants in 
the nation, and the challenge of transforming incoming populations into part of the Australian 
people .  
  
The successive policy models of immigrant admission and settlement, adopted by Australia since 
Federation, can be usefully explicated from this perspective.  The racially defined restrictions 
encompassed in the clearly named “Immigration Restriction Act” of 1901, which were motivated 
by fear of and disdain for the Chinese diaspora, represented a first technology of control (Lake & 
Reynolds 2008). Contemporary debates a century later about settlement procedures explore the 
tensions between the different priorities implicit in the competing policy discourses of 
multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and citizenship (Jakubowicz 2009) 
  
Australia’s colonial history is well known; the outpost of the British empire that became a clutch 
of colonies, which finally united in a “Commonwealth”, a federation of states with their 
distinctive histories, ethno-cultural profiles, and political philosophies. The new Commonwealth 
was immediately challenged by the sturdiness of its raison d’être, drawn from a multitude of 
factors ranging from guaranteeing free trade between colonies, and ensuring tariff-protected 
industries against the world outside, to ensuring a racially homogenous working class paradise. 
John Fitzgerald has noted the strong support for Federation from Australia’s Chinese 
communities, who saw in free trade the opening up of their unimpeded travel between colonies 
that previously had restricted and punitively taxed their movement. Many Chinese Australians of 
the day celebrated Australian democratic ideals, its egalitarian ethos, and its anti-feudal ideology 
and thrust towards modernity (Fitzgerald 2007; Lowe et al. 1879).  They were, as we know, to be 
grievously betrayed, their mere presence traduced, their culture portrayed as an anathema, and 
their aspirations discarded as threatening and poisonous.  White Australia was more than just an 
attempt to keep out people of colour; it was a drive to remove people of colour and scrub the 
society free of the taint of non-White “blood”. 
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White Australia was then a very real “imperial” moment, through which the Empire mantle 
carried by the British, was passed across to the new Nation. Even the British were less than 
enthusiastic about some dimensions of the handover; the Colonial and Foreign Office was firmly 
opposed to the use of race as a divider of peoples, acquiescing finally to the infamous dictation 
test as a racial proxy (Lake & Reynolds 2008). The test, first developed in Natal in South Africa 
to be used to limit Indian immigration (thus explaining the exhaustive list of language options 
that could be used to trip up any prospective Indian polyglot), was then introduced into the new 
Commonwealth.    
  
A colonial precursor to the national imperial project was the attempt of Queensland to annex 
south eastern New Guinea (Papua) in the 1880s. The British government refused to allow this, 
finally taking on the task itself when Germany formally seized northern New Guinea, with the 
Dutch already possessing the West. Britain only passed the colonial role to Australia after 
Federation (which presumably was somehow to restrain the Queenslanders’ excessive abuses 
and exploitation of the Papuan indigenous peoples, in the wake of its Kanaka “black-birding” 
history). 
  
Cyril Pearl in his biography of Herbert Morrison, later to be White Australia’s closest link to the 
unfolding drama of the end of the Chinese Imperial period, quotes from the Melbourne Leader 
newspaper in June 1883, 
 
We cannot let the islands of the Pacific pass into the hands of dangerous neighbours, and 
it is not only the European powers who can be dangerous to us.  Settlements of Chinamen 
or Malays will infallibly be formed… If Chinamen enter in, they will be the out-post of a 
possible Chinese invasion. (Pearl 1967, p.42). 
  
So the major imperial challenges to the Australian empire project did not come mainly from 
Holland, Germany or France, but rather from China and Japan.  The China challenge was until 
quite recently ethno-cultural and economic, rather than diplomatic or military, but Australia’s 
actions, attitudes and perspectives are still determined today by the instability of the many 
dimensions of the inter-imperial engagement. As the Chinese state has grown in economic power 
and political reach, Australia’s contemporary worries about China’s expanding regional role and 
investment in Australian economic resources sits over these historic racially-inflected attitudes. 
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From the outset the Australian colonies were closely linked to China, with the British China 
treaty ports and the Australian colonies developing a significant economic relationship. British 
colonial attitudes towards the Chinese were translated into the Australian colonial milieu; there 
were families with Chinese servants, and Chinese workers were widespread as shepherds, 
gardeners, cooks and shopkeepers. This was more like the Straits Colonies than life in the Home 
Counties. Chinese “coolie” labour was in Australia even before the Opium Wars. The free 
movement of Chinese into Australia accelerated with the various gold rushes, until in the 1880s 
the Northern Queensland Palmer River rush saw some 90% of the miners as Chinese.  So there 
were tens of thousands of Chinese craftsmen, workers, businessmen and even some politicians 
when Federation crashed down on them, and the doors for entry effectively closed. 
  
Fear of Empire today 
The March 2010 Lowy Institute survey of Australians’ attitudes to international affairs and 
China argued that “that Australians are increasingly conscious of China’s rise and are starting to 
grapple with its implications. Indeed China looms so large that Australians have developed a 
somewhat exaggerated view of its global weight” (Shearer 2010).  China’s economic role 
through the purchase of raw materials had seen Australia safely through the GFC (Laurenceson 
2008); 73% of Australians (up 10% from 2008) thought China’s growth had been good for 
Australia. About the same proportion thought though that China’s aim was to dominate Asia (up 
9% since 2008).  While happy to sell commodities to China, Australians were more reluctant to 
sell freehold to China – 57% thought the government allowed too much investment (up 7%). In 
addition 46% thought China would become a military threat within 20 years (up 5%).  
Meanwhile 2/3 believed Australia was soft on China’s transgression of human rights. Clive 
Palmer a Queensland billionaire mining magnate summarised the complexity when in September 
2009 he condemned as racist the government’s insistence that Chinese investments receive 
Treasury approval, claiming in relation to $1.8 trillion of Chinese reserve capital “We've got the 
opportunity to grab that if our politicians could only be fair and treat the Chinese people and 
Chinese government with the dignity they deserve" (Marriner, 2009).  Together these stories 
suggest a mix of moral superiority, greed and fear, a fairly traditional combination for imperialist 
endeavours. 
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Apart from the Foreign Investment Review Board criteria for differentiating Chinese from other 
sources of capital inflow, the government amended the Commonwealth Electoral Act in 2009 to 
outlaw foreign property donations to Australian political parties or involvement in political 
campaigns.  In this it was following on the US government that had banned foreign donations 
after a series of major scandals.  
  
The arguments for the banning of foreign donations drew heavily on the activities of Chinese 
corporations or individuals, and their involvement in Australian party funding, or in the 
suspected overly comfortable and financial relationship with Ministers. The legislative changes 
sustained the right of foreign entities and individuals to use Australian-derived assets to make 
declarable donations, but not foreign funds.  There was growing concern about the activities of 
some Chinese companies and individuals – for instance the Defence Minister resigned over 
undeclared business and other links (Sharp2009; Baker et al. 2010). 
  
Examples suggest the issues. Figures released by the Australian Electoral Commission in early 
2009( http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au) covering the 2007 Federal election identified Macau 
gaming figure Stanley Ho as the source of  $400,000 to the NSW ALP (and another $100,000 
from Anthony Chan who shared a Hong Kong address with Ho). Ho had unsuccessfully sought a 
share in the second Sydney casino license, having been blocked there (and in Melbourne). His 
Gold Coast based company Hungtat had a $600,000 donation to the NSW ALP returned, while 
his fourth wife Angela Leong had her $500,000 returned by the federal ALP following “a due 
diligence assessment”.  Ho was successful however in having a lunch meeting with former 
Premier Morris Iemma in 2006, after he donated $48,000 to the NSW ALP. 
  
The Commission also identified a stream of funding to both the ALP and the Liberal Party from 
companies associated with Chau Chuk Wing, including Kingold, Kingson, and Chun Yip.  (The 
names are wonderful – the Old King is the father’s major vehicle, the Son King is run by son 
Eric). Up to $1.6 million may have gone to the ALP, and $400,000 to the Liberals (Snow et al. 
2009). The Chau group has a long history in Australia and in the past decade has had financial 
dealings with Charles Sturt University, the University of Western Sydney and most recently with 
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the University of Technology, Sydney. From before 2006 Chau’s daughter Winky Chau, now an 
executive in the family’s New Express media empire, was community relations adviser to NSW 
ALP Premier Bob Carr and later Premier Morris Iemma, providing Iemma’s bridge to the 
Chinese community.  She would later set up a company with Iemma  (MW and W Asia Pacific 
Partnerships Pty Ltd  registered February 2009) that is involved in business links between 
Australia and China. 
  
This type of detail reflects a much wider pattern of imperial inter-engagement, suggested by the 
range of government, corporate and political contacts that have been laid down over the past 
twenty years. At the heart of the imperial issue lies the issue of economic control. This paper 
does not canvas that huge issue in any detail, rather pointing to the need for a systematic analysis 
of the economic penetration of Australia within the framework of the proposed imperial model 
(Laurenceson 2008).  The picture of Australian national apprehension of China reflects the many 
different interests that Australians have – ranging from primary producers and resource 
companies, through secondary industry and infrastructure providers, and then the tertiary sector 
such as finance, and education.  The most significant factor relates to the scale and 
interdependence of economic relations, where the Chinese economy now plays a determining 
role in the viability of the Australian economy.  For the first time since early British empire days 
a foreign power now has control over significant parts of the Australian economy; unlike the 
British example or even Japan, China has a central state strategy that ties together the role of 
Chinese entities in Australia (as it does elsewhere in the Pacific and in Africa and South 
America).  The China trade played a critical role in the survival of Australia through the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), with mineral exports and international education key areas of robust 
expansion (DFAT 2010). 
  
Multicultural politics and Chinese diversity 
The second dynamic relates to the presence of Chinese people in Australia as citizens, settlers, 
transient workers, students, business people, government officials, “refugees” and tourists.  The 
diversity within the category reflects the complexity of the Chinese diaspora, and the political 
argument about what it means to be Chinese and to which power is allegiance owed.  PR China 
is a vast country itself encompassing enormous diversity, and the Chinese extend far beyond 
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PRC. The development of greater Han nationalism that has characterized the state ideology over 
the past twenty years (Feng 2010), has been extremely influential on the new generation of PRC-
born people who have migrated to Australia, and has been used to argue a transnational Han 
solidarity (as expressed for instance in virtual Huaren networks such as 
http://www.huaren.org/chinese-communities/australia).  Yet they are only one part of the story. 
  
The diversity of those who have been labeled as “Chinese” by at least one stakeholder, includes 
the following categories: 
a. Australian-born of many generations of settlement (the White Australia survivors) 
whose forebears came from China 
b. The Colombo Plan generation – mainly English-speaking tertiary educated Chinese 
diaspora from Singapore, Malaysia, etc. Some were Chinese Malay leftists who came to 
Australia in the post- Malay insurgency period. Others came from Taiwan or Indonesia. 
c. Post white Australia entrants, mainly diasporic as in (b) but including significant 
groups from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as refugees, boat people, and orderly 
departure entrants. 
d. Skilled and other entrants who were able to leave China after the end of the Cultural 
Revolution and the opening up of economic reforms 
e. The June 4/Tiananmen generation – political, economic and in some cases 
opportunistic refugees 
f. Hong Kong residents leaving in preparation for the 1997 re-unification with the PRC. 
g. Professional and business people from Taiwan and PRC 
h. “Colonised” non-Han peoples, especially those from Tibet and Xinjiang. 
i. Sponsored immigrants of the current generation 
j. Students who gained permanent residence after completion of studies 
k. Visa category 457 skilled sponsored workers 
l.  Short term visitors who converted to permanent through applying for on-shore 
refugee consideration (often claiming to be persecuted Christians or Falun Gong) (RRT 
2008) 
m. Short term business managers and skilled workers associated with major Chinese 
development projects 
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n. Chinese government officials and quasi-officials, including those engaged in 
monitoring all these other groups (RRT 2007, 2008). 
  
There may indeed be other groups, and of course there are significant provincial/regional 
variations in migration histories, languages spoken, skill levels and education (Collins& Reid 
1995).  
  
Coghlan’s work on the demography of Australia’s Chinese population points to some important 
characteristics, especially of the PR China born settlers. Table 1 draws on his comparison of 
Chinese and Vietnamese settlement, which argues that the Chinese are more concentrated by 
locality than the Vietnamese (2009). Tracking PR China born residents, those claiming Chinese 
heritage (includes many from non-PRC) and speakers of Chinese languages, Coghlan 
demonstrates the ways in which the different meanings of “Chinese” can provide different 
pictures of the Chinese presence.  
  
Table 1 Number and percentage of  Australia’s total population by ancestry, birthplace and language, 
1976-2006 (Census data) 
Year Ancestry: 
Chinese 
 Country of 
Birth: PRC 
 Speakers of 
Chinese 
languages 
 
1976     19542 0.14     
1981     25883 0.18     
1986 201165 1.29 36595 0.24 127959 0.89 
1991     77882 0.46 247563 1.59 
1996     111009 0.62 344319 1.92 
2001 556554 2.97 142780 0.75 401357 2.19 
2006 669890 3.37 206589 1.03 500467 2.50 
 
From: Coughlan 2009, p.164 
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Given the high proportion of “Chinese” living in the Sydney SD in 2006, a closer examination of 
their situation reveals how the different criteria produce rather different perspectives. About 53% 
of all Australian PR Chinese live in the Sydney SD, comprising some 71% of the “Chinese” 
population there (PRC, HK, Taiwan); they may moreover have been long-term residents of Hong 
Kong or Taiwan prior to immigration. 
  
About 230,000 people claim to speak at least one of the named Chinese languages (Cantonese, 
Mandarin, Other), far higher than the 150,000 who were born in one of the Chinas. Of these 
about 125,000 speak Cantonese, and 97,000 Mandarin, with 12,000 speaking Other languages 
(Teochew, Hokkien and Hakka).  About 290,000 claim Chinese ancestry, of whom 270,000 had 
both parents born overseas, with only 6000 having both born in Australia.  Mandarin speakers 
(from the mainland and Taiwan) have a lower likelihood of being Australian citizens than 
Cantonese speakers (61%:86%), reflecting the historical political press for Australian citizenship 
among Hong Kong and Macau origin settlers, perhaps the reluctance of many PRC citizens to 
give up their PRC citizenship, and also recency of arrival.  However to confuse matters slightly, 
over a thousand Sydney residents born in China claimed both Russian Orthodox religious 
affiliation and Russian ancestry, while over 400 claimed Russian Orthodoxy and Chinese 
ancestry (ABS Census 2006). 
  
This diversity has been well documented (eg  Ang 2000, 2001), as its effects contribute to an 
apparent impossibility of a unified or cohesive Chinese political presence in Australia. North 
American studies have pointed to the relatively low level of formal political representations of 
Chinese communities in the USA and Canada, relative to their size (Freedman 2000; Fernando 
2006). Three reasons are suggested for this situation among those who accept such claims: a) 
community fragmentation absorbs energy in intra-communal struggles for influence; b) the focus 
in the first generation on economic establishment and success absorbs most of the creative 
energy available to recent settlers – they would be more interested in Chinese schools than in 
Chinese politicians; and c) power is exerted through influence networks (mobilizing guanxi) 
(Hutchings & Murray 2002) rather than through access to authoritative institutional roles in the 
host society (Chin 1997; Kwok 2008; Gao 2006, 2009).  Even so this population is well educated 
and well placed in the developing knowledge economy; in 2006, 15.7% held postgraduate 
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degrees (All Australians 3.9%), 24.6% held Bachelor degrees (16.2%), while 37.0% held no 
qualifications (45.2%). They were strongly represented in the fields of IT at 10.7% (3.5%) and 
Management and Commerce at 32.1% (20.8%). 
  
The complexity of the “Chinese”, among who are people who would reject that appellation (and 
whose struggle against the Chinese state has spilled over into Australia), clearly does render any 
single unified body representing a Chinese interest rather difficult to create. This could be 
contrasted with the African Communities Council of Australia, the Australian Arabic Council 
and the Arab Australia Council, and even the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of 
Australia. These federated bodies seek to provide a common voice for groups that seek a unified 
outcome. 
  
“Chinese” is therefore not such a bridging label as might commonly be thought.  But this may be 
no different to what might be said of earlier immigrant communities, and their marginalisation 
through the first generation of settlement (Zappala 1998). Multicultural political analysis as a 
branch of interest group politics, constructs a view of Australian society that frames ethnic 
communities as interest groups – with specific, usually first generation, concerns (Jupp 1984; 
Jupp et al. 1989; Kymlicka 2007; Levey 2008; Lopez 2000; Modood 2007). The standard 
rhetoric of multiculturalism usually seeks to mobilise wider social support through 
foregrounding concepts such as productive diversity, and arguing for its role in enhancing 
cosmopolitan capabilities in society (including bi-lingualism and intercultural communication 
competence). In practice a multicultural polity depends on well-organised ethnically-focused 
organisations able to both articulate the particular interests of their groups, and engage in 
coalitions with similar groups to deliver broader policy outcomes that provide individual benefits 
to the groups, and to their constituencies (Levey 2008). 
  
One of the more salient characteristics of “Chinese” communities therefore can be found in the 
multiplicity of groups and institutions, and their interlinkage with commercial or quasi-
commercial enterprises. Some of these organisations are purely local, some are international but 
locally-focused (eg clan groups), while some are trans-national (China/Australia) and others 
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international (eg diasporic multi-nation associations) (Lever-Tracy et al. 1996; Suryadinata 
2004). 
  
“Multicultural democracy” (Kymlicka 2007) refers to a system of liberal democracy in which 
cultural-descent groups are recognised as legitimate actors, and in which cultural heritage issues 
are legitimately part of the political debate. However there can be theoretical tension between 
conceiving of the political system as a distributive environment for competing interest groups, 
and viewing it as a dynamic arena for redistributive justice and the overcoming of discrimination 
and marginalisation. This tension becomes especially apparent where the nation state involved has a 
history of racially-biased legislation, and newly immigrating communities still experience racism 
(Fernando 2007). The Australian political system is still influenced by racist histories, while Asian 
immigrants still experience some forms of racism, and multicultural democracy has as one of its tasks the 
working through of these issues, towards equitable participation. 
  
Australian Chinese and racism 
As already discussed the Chinese have a long and unfortunate history as the Australian national 
“Other”. With the end of the White Australia policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the 
arrival after 1975 of large numbers of Vietnamese Chinese, the doorway has apparently opened.  
The presence of Chinese increased dramatically after 1991, with the so-called June 4 immigrants, 
given open refuge after the Tiananmen events. Yet the racism that has been a defining 
characteristic of Australia’s empire project in the past has not simply dissipated. While Kevin 
Dunn (2003) has found that Australians are less (but even so still) prejudiced against “Asians” 
than they are against Muslims and Indigenous people, Booth et al. (2009) identified the Chinese 
as the group most likely to suffer discrimination in employment on the basis merely of their 
names. Forrest and Dunn (2007) have also noted the quite high rates of racism and 
discrimination reported by Chinese Australians at work and in public.   
 
Critics have argued that one of the major problems with Australian multiculturalism lies in 
systematic failure by government to engage with residual racism; indeed denial of racism has 
been a more likely response by government when confronted with inter-communal violence, than 
any sustained strategy of intervention. Even the Government’s own Australian Human Rights 
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Commission has criticised government inaction on racism in its submission to the United 
Nations (AHRC 2010). 
 
From the Blainey period on Australian Chinese have been involved in anti-racism politics, 
seeking both recognition as equal members of Australian society, and government action to 
reduce discrimination and prejudice. In part their strong support for McKew in Bennelong in 
2007 reflected the view in the Chinese (and other Asian) communities that the Liberal Party 
under John Howard had adopted views that they experienced as racist, and that Howard 
symbolically represented the last embers of White Australia. However Chinese community 
leaders have expressed disappointment with the failure of the ALP government to adopt a Bill of 
Rights, to advance a policy on multiculturalism, or to signal a public commitment against racism.  
  
Next steps 
The “Chinese” question thus presents the first case of a post multicultural politics, characterised 
by large scale economic ties to Australia, operated through the entities of an imperial nation 
state, supported by a significant government bureaucracy (through the consulates and related 
agencies) and interacting with many different civil society organisations. In 2008/9 the 
collectivity of identifiable Chinese (PR China, HK, Macau, Taiwan) made up the largest of the 
non-British immigrant intakes (especially with the inclusion of students in DIAC NOM figures 
after 2006). 
  
With the growing presence of China as a global power, international studies of Chinese 
immigrants in national political life have sought to bring together studies of “immigrant” 
enclaves and their political practices, with studies of transnational networks.  Freedman (2000) in 
her examination of Chinese in the political life of the USA found that the two key assumptions 
widely held in the scholarly literature and “in popular opinion”, that the Chinese are pawns of 
their homeland governments, and that they are politically passive preferring to concentrate on 
economic advancement, were not upheld by recent research. Freedman distinguishes between 
political influence and political participation, noting influence is a function of economic power, 
while participation is a function of the political system’s openness to new entrants (2000, p.183). 
This is a useful distinction with valuable indications for Australian research.  Fernando (2007) 
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working from within a paradigm of “critical multiculturalism”, extends the terrain of Freedman’s 
study into a comparison of Toronto and Los Angeles. She takes on the same contradiction 
between economic success and apparent political exclusion. The problem she argues lies in the 
tension between a racialised state structure and a public ideology of equality, producing a 
“democratic deficit”. Multiculturalism as an ideology may disguise the realities of unequal 
access to power, where active blocking by existing power elites denies access to the formal 
political system. 
  
The two empires projects now overlap, and are deeply implicated in each others’ futures, as they 
have been in the past. The relative size differences obviously point to the dominance of the PRC 
in the politico-economic relationship, over the Australia/Taiwan and other diasporic ties.  
However the China relationship, while a key determinant of this post-multicultural world, does 
not encompass the whole picture.  
 
China has voiced its own perception of this challenge. The former Chinese ambassador Zhang 
Junsai, said on his departure that Australia has become a crucial testing ground for China’s 
relations with the West and other Asia-Pacific countries. Speaking with The Australian’s Rowan 
Callick in September 2010, Zhang said that "there is no conflict of interest, not in history nor in 
territory" though he recognised the rising apprehension reflected in public discourse and 
government defence thinking (Callick 2010).  
  
For Australia’s (post) multicultural democracy to ensure the allegiance of its diverse population, 
it has to ensure the pathways to participation are open and the moralities of liberal pluralism are 
firmly embedded and fully exercised (Galligan and Roberts, 2008). The points of tension lie 
exactly at the intersections of ethno-nationalisms, imperial interests and political systems. 
Australia’s empire project has to ensure that the emerging Australian ethno-nationalism includes 
rather than marginalizes its “Chinese” citizens, and embeds Australia’s Chinese histories as part 
of the common national narrative (Lake 2008).   
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